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 Abstract— Ground penetrating radar (GPR) is one of the most 
popular and successful sensing modalities that has been 
investigated for landmine and subsurface threat detection.   Many 
of the detection algorithms applied to this task are supervised and 
therefore require labeled examples of target and non-target data 
for training.  Training data most often consists of 2-dimensional 
images (or patches) of GPR data, from which features are 
extracted, and provided to the classifier during training and 
testing.  Identifying desirable training and testing locations to 
extract patches, which we term “keypoints”, is well established in 
the literature.  In contrast however, a large variety of strategies 
have been proposed regarding keypoint utilization (e.g., how many 
of the identified keypoints should be used at targets, or non-target, 
locations).  Given the variety keypoint utilization strategies that 
are available, it is very unclear (i) which strategies are best, or (ii) 
whether the choice of strategy has a large impact on classifier 
performance. We address these questions by presenting a 
taxonomy of existing utilization strategies, and then evaluating 
their effectiveness on a large dataset using many different 
classifiers and features.  We analyze the results and propose a new 
strategy, called PatchSelect, which outperforms other strategies 
across all experiments. 
 
Index Terms—training, ground penetrating radar, landmine 
detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A popular approach for detecting buried threats, such as 
landmines and other explosive hazards, is the use of remote 
sensing technologies.  One of the most successful modalities for 
remote sensing of buried threats is the ground penetrating radar 
(GPR) [1]–[5].  The typical GPR consists of an array of 
antennas that are directed toward the ground.  An individual 
GPR antenna operates by emitting a radar signal towards the 
ground and then measuring the energy that is reflected back.  
The result of this sensing process is a time-series of energy 
measurements for the given antenna, referred to as an A-scan 
[6]. 
In the context of buried threat detection (BTD), GPR sensors 
collect A-scans at regular spatial intervals as they move across 
the surface of the ground (e.g., on the front of a vehicle as it 
drives forward).   The resulting A-scans, each collected at a 
different spatial location, can then be concatenated to form 
images of the subsurface, termed B-scans [1], [2], [7].  B-scans 
have one spatial axis, and one temporal axis. The signals 
returned from buried threats typically exhibit characteristic 
hyperbolic patterns in the B-scans, which can be leveraged for 
detection [6], [8]–[10].  Figure 1 shows several examples of B-
scans collected over buried threats.   
Although it is possible to manually identify buried threats in 
GPR data, a great deal of published research has focused on 
automating this process with computer algorithms that provide 
a confidence of buried threat presence at each spatial location 
[4], [7], [8], [11]–[16].  Proposed algorithms have employed a 
variety of techniques from statistics [17], [18], computer vision 
[6], [19], [20], and machine learning [7], [21], [22].  The most 
successful approach to date involves the use of supervised 
learning techniques [12], [23]–[27].    
A typical processing pipeline for supervised detection 
algorithms begins with a “prescreening” operation, in which a 
relatively fast algorithm is applied to the full set of GPR data 
(e.g., a 3D volume, or B-scan) in order to identify a smaller 
subset of spatial locations on the ground, which are 
subsequently processed by the supervised algorithms. 
Prescreening is used primarily because it dramatically reduces 
the amount of data required for both training and testing 
supervised algorithms, making it possible to apply such 
algorithms in real-time applications (e.g., on a truck while 
driving).  In the second step of processing, one or more 2D 
patches of GPR data are extracted at each prescreener alarm 
location, and a (trained) supervised algorithm is applied to the 
patches in order to predict whether each alarm location is a 
threat, or non-threat.   
In order to train supervised classifiers, they must be provided 
with examples of data from each class (i.e., threat and non-
threat).  As mentioned, training examples most often consist of 
small image patches that are extracted from B-scans at locations 
in the GPR volume where useful signals (i.e., those 
corresponding to both threats, or suspicious non-threats) are 
estimated to exist [1], [4], [6]–[8], [12], [28]–[32].  In this work, 
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Figure 1: Examples of three B-scans collected over three different buried 
threats.  Each column of this image is the time series of data (i.e., time of 
arrival, the y-axis) collected at a single spatial location.  Consecutive A-
scans, for a single antenna, collected as the vehicle travels down the lane 
(i.e., down track, the x-axis), are shown here as an image.  The target 
signatures in this figure illustrate some of the variability in the response 
that is possible in GPR data.  This includes varying the y-offset of the top 
of the signature, having several independent regions, and extending over 
a very different number of time samples.  
  
 we refer to these useful signal locations as “keypoints”. The 
performance of supervised algorithms depends strongly upon 
the training data that the algorithm is provided, and as a result, 
the way in which keypoints are (i) identified and (ii) utilized, 
forms an important design choice for supervised GPR 
algorithms.       
A.  Keypoint identification 
A GPR keypoint consists of a spatial location as well as a 
temporal location (or sometimes depth).  The way in which 
keypoints are identified is fairly consistent in most existing 
GPR-based threat detection research.  The spatial location is 
typically either (i) known in advance because the objects were 
deliberately buried [1], [6] or (ii) it is estimated using a 
detection algorithm (sometimes called a prescreener) that 
precedes supervised classification algorithms [1], [6], [7], [11], 
[12], [33], [34].   
Once the spatial location is obtained, the temporal location 
can be estimated. By far, the most common approach for 
temporal estimation relies on extracting keypoints at locations 
of high energy (e.g., local maxima) in the GPR A-scans [6], [8], 
[20], [29], [35]–[39].  These energy-based methods often yield 
multiple keypoints at each spatial location.  Figure 2 illustrates 
a previously proposed method [37], which we term the max-
smoothed-energy keypoint (MSEK) approach.  MSEK is used 
in this work, and is representative of most existing temporal 
identification approaches, though some others do exist [8], [10], 
[39]–[41]. 
 
B. Keypoint utilization  
Although there is a general consensus in the literature about 
how to identify keypoints (i.e. that regions of high radar 
amplitude are of interest), there is relatively little agreement 
regarding keypoint utilization.  Here, keypoint utilization will 
refer to the process of deciding which keypoints, of those 
identified, that should be provided to the supervised classifiers 
for training, as well as testing.   
Consider first the problem of keypoint utilization for training. 
Keypoint identification approaches, such as MSEK, yield 
multiple keypoints at each spatial location.  As a result, it is 
unclear which keypoints should be retained for training, and 
this ambiguity is evidenced by the large number of keypoint 
utilization approaches that have been proposed in the literature 
(see section II). To date, it is unclear which of these utilization 
strategies are best, or whether there are any generally superior 
approaches at all.     
Similar design choices must be made for keypoint 
identification during algorithm testing as well: given a spatial 
location generated by a prescreener, which temporal locations 
should be evaluated by the (trained) classifier?  Further, given 
multiple decision statistics at each spatial location, how should 
a final, single, statistic be computed?  Similar to utilization for 
training, a large variety of utilization approaches have been 
employed in the literature during testing [9], [18], [34], [35], 
[38], [41], [44], and it is likewise unclear which existing 
strategies, if any, are superior.   
C. Contributions of this work 
In this work we investigate the problem of keypoint 
utilization during both training and testing.  We present a 
taxonomy of existing keypoint utilization strategies, and then 
compare their effectiveness on a large dataset of GPR data using 
several combinations of state-of-the-art classifiers and features. 
The results indicate that keypoint utilization can have a 
significant impact on the classification performance, and that 
some utilization strategies do generally outperform others. 
Further, we introduce and apply a new utilization method that 
was inspired by the comparison of existing methods.  This 
proposed method, called “PatchSelect”, outperforms all 
existing methods across all combinations of features and 
classifiers tested in this work.  As further analysis, we present 
several small-scale experiments that motivated the design of 
PatchSelect, as well as elucidating effective practices for 
keypoint utilization.  In the conclusions section, we also discuss 
limitations of our work, including PatchSelect. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II, we present a taxonomy for the different keypoint 
utilization methods that have been proposed in the literature.  In 
Section III, the experimental design of a large-scale comparison 
of keypoint utilization strategies is explained.  In Section IV, 
the results of the comparison are presented.  In Section V, the 
small-scale experiments motivating PatchSelect are presented.  
In Section VI, conclusions are drawn and recommendations are 
given for the design of future BTD systems. 
II. KEYPOINT UTILIZATION STRATEGIES 
In this section, we present a taxonomy of existing keypoint 
utilization strategies that have been employed in the literature. 
Keypoint utilization strategies, as defined here, consist of two 
components: one component for training, and one component 
for testing.  We will present a taxonomy of existing methods 
based on a few characteristic differences they have during both 
training, and testing.  Table 1 in this section presents the 
 
Figure 2: the process of identifying the temporal location of GPR 
keypoints with MSEK.  In MSEK, (a) the raw data is (b) depth 
normalized, (c) the central A-scan is squared and smoothed and keypoints 
are identified by the maximum values in the transformed, central A-scan.  
At the top maxima locations, indicated by stars in (c), patches are 
extracted, where the three examples shown in (d) correspond to the data 
in the red boxes drawn in (b). 
 
  
 taxonomy of each existing method, as well as our proposed 
method, PatchSelect.   
A. Strategies for training 
 During training, there are two main characteristics that 
differentiate existing keypoint utilization strategies: the number 
of keypoints extracted at each spatial location, denoted by 𝐾, 
and how this number varies between target locations and non-
target locations.  
For example, many strategies utilize keypoints at the top 𝐾 
energy locations, where 𝐾 is the same for both target and non-
target cases [2], [6], [9], [18], [20], [34], [37]–[40].   In contrast, 
in [29], [42], [43], a different 𝐾 is used for target and non-target 
cases.  Other strategies use energy keypoints for target  cases 
but extract data for non-target cases at regular or random 
intervals down the A-scan (i.e., no estimation of non-target data 
localization is performed) [7], [19], [27], [42], [43], [44].  
Finally, in [27], every time point is considered in training as a 
keypoint for both classes.  These methods are listed in Table 1 
where each method’s keypoint utilization strategy for target and 
non-target is listed.   
B. Strategies for testing 
The characteristics that differentiate utilization strategies 
during testing are very different than those during training.  The 
primary reason for this is that, during testing, the primary goal 
of utilization is to obtain a single decision statistic for each 
spatial location.  Every spatial location consists of many 
potential keypoints (one keypoint at each temporal location), 
and therefore we must decide: (1) how many total keypoints, 
denoted by 𝐿, should be utilized to compute a final decision 
statistic at that location; and (2) upon what criteria (e.g., energy) 
we should choose these keypoints.   In the remainder of this 
section we explain the common approaches existing utilization 
methods take to address these questions, and we include these 
into our taxonomy in Table 1.   
Existing strategies typically choose which keypoints to 
utilize based on one of two ordering criteria.  The first ordering 
criterion is to utilize keypoints at maximum energy locations, 
in the same way it is done during training [8], [10], [35], [39], 
[45].  This is denoted as “En” in Table 1.  The second ordering 
criterion is to utilize the largest classifier decision statistics, 
denoted as “DS” in Table 1.  In this scenario, the classifier is 
applied at regular intervals along the A-scan and keypoints at 
the 𝐿 locations with the largest classifier decision statistics are 
utilized [6], [7], [11], [28].  The strategies in [8], [10], [20], [35], 
[36], [39], [45] set 𝐿 = 𝐾, so that the same number of keypoints 
are utilized in training and testing.   
Once an ordering criterion for the set of 𝐿 testing keypoints 
is chosen, a final decision statistic must be computed.  At a 
spatial location, the strategy’s ordering criterion (i.e., En/DS) is 
used to organize the decision statistics in to a decreasing 
sequence 𝐷 = {𝑑(𝑗); 𝑗 = 1 … 𝐿} from which a final decision 
statistic 𝐷𝑓 is computed.  Several approaches are taken toward 
obtaining a final decision statistic.  First, if En is the ordering 
criterion, then 𝐷𝑓 = max 𝐷 for all such methods listed in Table 
1 [2], [5], [8], [39].  Second, if DS is the ordering criterion, a 
function 𝑔 is typically defined to compute 𝐷𝑓.  Several different 
options for 𝑔 have been considered such as: max, sum over all 𝑇 
(all time points), or mean of the top 3 decision statistics [9], 
[18], [34], [6], [16], [27], [29], [43], [46], [47].  Note that these 
three options for 𝑔 can be parametrized.  If 𝑔 is defined by 
 
𝑔(𝐷, 𝐿) =  ∑ 𝑑(𝑗)
𝐿
𝑗=1
 (1) 
then for 𝐿 = 1, 𝑔(𝐷, 1) = 𝑑1 = max (𝐷).  Similarly, if 𝐿 = 𝑇, 
then 𝑔(𝐷, 𝑇) =  ∑ 𝑑(𝑡)𝑇𝑡=1 = sum(𝐷).  Finally, if 𝐿 = 3, 
then 𝑔(𝐷, 3) = 𝑑(1) + 𝑑(2) + 𝑑(3).  This is not the same 
numeric value as the average of the top 3 confidences, but every 
output of 𝑔 is a constant scaling factor from the average (i.e., 
off by a factor of 3) and such a factor does not affect the 
probability of detection and of false alarm.  Because of the 
similarity of the three different methods employed in the 
literature, they are listed in their parametrized form in Table 1. 
 
C. PatchSelect 
The training and testing strategies described in this section 
are summarized in Table 1, along with the proposed PatchSelect 
method.  PatchSelect consists of training on the top 4 energy 
keypoints for targets and on patches extracted at small, regular 
intervals along the central A-scan for non-targets.  In testing, 
the sum of the top 12 decision statistics is reported as the final 
confidence. 
To determine the specific design choices for the PatchSelect 
strategy, a series of experiments were conducted (described in 
Table 1: A table of existing keypoint utilization strategies, including 
the proposed method, PatchSelect. In training, the number of patches 
for targets and non-targets are given.  In both cases, if no parenthesis 
is written, then the locations are chosen using an energy-based 
temporal localization method (e.g., MSEK).  The demarcation of “reg” 
means that that number of patches were extracted at regular intervals, 
and “rand” means that they were extracted at random.  In testing, the 
number 𝑳 specifies the number of decision statistics used to obtain a 
final confidence.  The column “En/DS” denotes whether the locations 
from which the decision statistic is taken depends on its (top 𝑳) 
maximum energy locations, “En”, or whether the top 𝑳 decision 
statistics, “DS”, are used.  Method 𝟗 is unique in that a sliding window 
operation is first performed on the decision statistics where the 7 
consecutive confidences are summed.   
  Train Testing 
Index Reference #target #non-
target 
En/DS 𝑳 
1 [6] 3 3 DS 3 
2 [8], [39] 2 2 En 2 
3 [42]–[44] 1 5 
(reg) 
DS 3 
4 [29] 1 5 
(rand) 
DS 𝑇 
5 [36] 1 1 DS 12 
6 [20] 1 1 DS 1 
7 [21] 5 
(reg) 
5 
(rand) 
DS 𝑇 
8 [5] 3 3 En 1 
9 [11] 1 1 DS sliding 
max 
10 [2] 1 1 En 1 
11 PatchSelect 4 reg DS 12 
 
 Section V) to identify which utilization characteristics tend to 
yield better performance.  In particular, we investigate the 
impact of several of the characteristics in Table 1 that we used 
to taxonomize existing methods (e.g., how many 𝐻0𝑠 to use in 
training).  The results of these experiments reveal good general 
practices for keypoint utilization, and motivated our design of 
PatchSelect.  
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
In this section we present an experimental method used for 
comparing the keypoint utilization strategies shown in Table 1.  
The utilization strategies are compared by evaluating the 
performance of several state-of-the-art feature sets and 
classifiers when each of the keypoint utilization strategies are 
employed during training and testing.   
 
A. Evaluation dataset 
The data used in this work was collected using a downward 
looking GPR (similar to the one described in [33]), at a western 
U.S. test site over a total area of 167,167.3 m2.  The data was 
collected over 8 test lanes for a total of 75 runs over all of the 
lanes.  The dataset includes 1,967 target encounters.  From this 
collection of data, spatial and temporal locations must be 
identified to act as training and testing data for targets and non-
targets.  
To identify spatial locations of interest for targets and non-
targets, a prescreener can be used [1], [8], [27], [32], [43].  To 
correspond alarms with targets, GPS data is collected along 
with the GPR data, where the GPS locations of buried threats is 
known a priori.  The remaining alarms correspond to non-
targets and are used for training the algorithm to recognize non-
targets, because those are the instances it will have to classify 
at test time.  In this work, the energy-based F1V4 prescreener 
[48] is used, which identifies locations with anomalous energy 
profile compared to the relatively unchanging background.  A 
sensitivity threshold is set for the prescreener which yields a 
dataset of 1,771 target alarms and 640 non-target alarms.  This 
threshold was chosen to achieve the highest possible probability 
of detection with this prescreener at an operationally feasible 
false alarm rate (number of false alarms per unit area). 
 
B. MSEK for keypoint identification  
Given spatial locations generated by the F1V4 prescreener, 
keypoint identification was performed using the MSEK 
algorithm which was first introduced in [37] and has been 
employed in many studies [6], [19], [21], [36], [49].  The 
process of obtaining temporal keypoints using MSEK is 
illustrated in Figure 2.  In MSEK, the data is depth normalized, 
the central A-scan is squared and smoothed and keypoints are 
identified at the maximum values in the transformed A-scan.  A 
patch of data can then be extracted surrounding at each 
maximum location, examples of which are shown in Figure 3.  
While other methods exist for temporal keypoint localization, 
MSEK is representative of methods relying on the measured 
amplitudes, and is simple to implement and use.  For this 
reason, only MSEK is used for keypoint identification with this 
data set. 
 
C. Feature sets and classifiers 
The different keypoint utilization approaches that are 
summarized in Table 1 are evaluated using several 
combinations of features and classifiers to investigate which 
methods tend to be the most effective.  Following the approach 
for evaluating a BTD algorithm described in [6], features are 
extracted at each keypoint and are used to train and test 
classifiers.  These features and classifiers were chosen because 
they have been used frequently in the GPR buried threat 
detection literature [6], [8], [19], [28], [38].  The resulting 
feature and classifier combinations are referred to as BTD 
algorithms. 
In this study, we consider several sets of features that have 
recently been applied for BTD with GPR: the raw data 
(rasterized) (e.g., [24], [50]), histogram of oriented gradients 
(HOG) features (e.g. [6], [8], [51]), and edge histogram 
descriptor (EHD) features (e.g., [7], [28], [52]).  The data 
patches on which features are extracted are of size 18 × 18 
pixels and rescaled to have values between −1 and 1.  To match 
the results from [6], the parameter choices for HOG and EHD 
are kept the same: the HOG feature is computed in cells of 6 ×
6 pixels, normalized in blocks of 3 × 3 cells, and 9 angle bins 
and the EHD feature is computed with a threshold of 0.15.  The 
threshold for declaring a gradient as “no-edge” in EHD depends 
on the scaling of the data.   
We used two classifiers in this work: a radial basis function 
SVM [53] and a random forest (RF) classifier (100 trees, 2 
variable splits at nodes, with central axis projection) [54].  
These two classifiers were chosen because of their recent 
application to GPR resulting in state-of-the-art detection 
performance [6], [8], [12], [36], [45], [55], [56]. 
 
D. Cross-Validation and performance metrics 
In this work we trained and tested each classifier using four-
fold cross-validation. This is a common approach for evaluating 
the performance of machine learning algorithms, and has been 
employed previously for BTD with GPR data [6], [20], [28].  
Additional care had to be taken in our experiments because the 
GPR data is collected over the same lane multiple times.  As a 
result, all alarms within a certain spatial distance were clustered 
and assigned to the same fold, to avoid training and testing over 
the same physical area.  To properly handle the issues 
associated with proper cross-validation on this type of data set, 
 
Figure 3: Examples of extracted patches at keypoint locations at known 
target locations.  The patches capture some part of the target signature 
which is used during training as an example of general target signature 
appearance. 
  
 researchers at the University of Florida developed software 
which is used here and has been used in many previous studies 
[1], [6], [7], [11], [29], [34]. 
To compare the detection performance of each trained 
classifier, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are 
used.  ROC curves are a common metric for comparing machine 
learning algorithms, and they are likewise popular in the BTD 
algorithm research literature [1], [6], [7], [11], [29], [34].  ROC 
curves plot the relationship between the false detection rate (x-
axis) and true detection rate (y-axis) of a detection algorithm, 
as the sensitivity of the algorithm is varied.  In the BTD 
literature, it is common to scale the x-axis of the ROC curve to 
report the false alarm rate in terms of false alarms per square 
meter [1], [11], [56], and we adopt this practice here.  
The ROC curve can also be summarized with a single 
statistic.  One commonly-used statistic for this purpose is the 
partial area under the ROC curve (pAUC).  This metric is 
obtained by computing the area under the ROC curve between 
two false alarm rate (FAR) values (e.g., 0 and 0.005 FAR). 
pAUC is frequently used for performance comparisons in the 
BTD literature [33], [37], [55], [57], [58].        
IV. COMPARISON OF KEYPOINT UTILIZATION STRATEGIES 
This section presents the results from the comparison of the 
eleven keypoint utilization strategies listed in Table 1 and 
discussed above.   
 
A. Performance of keypoint utilization strategies 
Results of this evaluation are shown in Figure 4 where the 
pAUC of the 10 strategies from the literature and PatchSelect 
are grouped by their performance under the different feature 
and classifier combinations.  We make several observations of 
the outcome indicated by these results. 
First, the choice of keypoint utilization strategy can have a 
large impact on performance.  For example, choosing 
PatchSelect over strategy 3 for the Raw SVM feature and 
classifier combination yields a pAUC improvement of 0.058.  
Furthermore, if strategy 6 is used for keypoint utilization, the 
Raw SVM BTD algorithm would be considered among the 
worst performers among the 6 algorithms, whereas with 
PatchSelect it is the best performer across all conditions.  The 
variance in performance for a single feature and classifier 
combination suggests that choosing a poor performing keypoint 
utilization strategy could negatively bias the results of a new 
BTD algorithm that may have merit when accounting for the 
training and testing variance.  
Second, certain strategies are consistently among the top 
performers (e.g., strategies 3, and 5).  The average rank of top 
performing strategies such as 3 and 5 across the 6 BTD 
algorithms is 3 and 3.7 respectively.  This suggests that certain 
practices are generally good for keypoint utilization when 
training and testing BTD algorithms. This result is important 
because it implies that by using those good practices as a 
strategy for keypoint utilization, the possible loss in 
performance will be due to the algorithm design and not due to 
how it is trained.  Thus, using identified best practices 
simplifies evaluating the performance of BTD algorithms. 
Third, Figure 4 shows that PatchSelect outperforms all other 
strategies for the 6 BTD algorithms except for HOG RF where 
strategy 3 and PatchSelect are tied.  We developed PatchSelect 
by identifying best practices among other existing strategies 
and incorporating them into a single training and testing 
strategy.  The practices suggested by PatchSelect seem to 
provide generally stable results even if the approach is changed 
slightly, as described in section V.  The limitations of this 
comparison and these conditions are discussed in the 
conclusions section. 
Fourth, some strategies in the above comparison seem to 
consistently perform at the bottom.  A caveat about these 
methods (in particular [21], [29], strategies 7 and 4 
respectively) is that they were designed for a different 
classification paradigm than the one used in this work, namely, 
Multiple Instance Learning. 
 
B. Performance sensitivity to varying pAUC measures 
The pAUC measures presented in Figure 3 are computed 
over a specific range of FAR values (i.e., 0 to 0.005 FAR).   This 
metric summarizes the performance of each classification 
algorithm only over the aforementioned FAR range, and 
therefore the results may not hold for a different FAR range.   In 
 
 
Figure 4: pAUC of the 11 utilization strategies listed in Table 1 are shown with pAUC calculated up to a FAR of 0.005.  Each group of 11 bars represents 
a separate feature and classifier combination (listed on the x axis) where the random forest is denoted as “RF”.  The 11 bars can be compared for their 
effectiveness within group and bars of the same color, representing the same strategy, can be compared across condition. 
  
 this section we evaluate the pAUC of the classification models 
as we vary the FAR range in the pAUC computation.   In 
particular, we vary the larger of the two FAR values, which we 
term 𝐹𝐴𝑅2, and compute the average pAUC of each keypoint 
utilization approach.  These results are shown in Figure 5.   
The results of this analysis indicate that the rank order of the 
different strategies remains relatively unchanged as the FAR 
range is varied.   Further, for each FAR value, the pAUC of 
PatchSelect (strategy #11) is higher than that of any other 
strategy.  
 
V. MOTIVATION FOR THE PATCHSELECT STRATEGY  
To understand the specific parameter choices for PatchSelect 
given in Table 1, a study of the design choices of existing 
methods is conducted in this section.  As discussed in section II, 
each strategy defines a particular way to train (e.g., use 3 
keypoints at maximum energy locations for both classes) and a 
particular way to test (e.g., sum the top 3 decision statistics).  
The experiments in this section address the sensitivity in 
performance associated with these choices.  For brevity, the 
results of these questions are shown here using the HOG feature 
with the random forest classifier (denoted HOG-RF).  This 
choice is somewhat arbitrary, but it was chosen because trends 
exhibited by HOG-RF are fairly consistent across other features 
and classifiers.  Additionally, PatchSelect was shown in Figure 
4 to outperform other methods consistently across all tested 
BTD algorithms, suggesting that the conclusions drawn from 
HOG-RF are indeed general.  Further, the comparison of 
performance as a function of the final FAR threshold in 
section IV.B suggested that the rank ordering of the results is 
relatively insensitive to that threshold.  For this reason, the 
results of these experiments are shown for a pAUC computed 
to a FAR of 0.005. 
 
A. How keypoints should be chosen at test time: energy or 
classifier confidence?  
Strategies differ in their use of keypoints at test time, between 
energy and classifier decision statistics.  In this section we try 
to examine whether one of these two approaches tends to be 
superior to the other. To do this, we compared these two general 
approaches while controlling for many other experimental 
factors (e.g., different training strategies for targets and non-
targets).  The results of this comparison are presented in Figure 
6, which suggest that using the top decision statistics 
outperforms using decision statistics at maximum energy 
locations.   
 
B. How many testing keypoints should be used? 
In each strategy, the number of testing keypoints, 𝐿, has to be 
specified.  In this section, we examine how to determine that 
number.  This number depends on whether energy maxima, or 
decision statistics, are needed.  The results presented in Figure 
6 suggest that using 𝐿 = 4 for energy maxima works best 
whereas, 6 ≤ 𝐿 ≤ 12 is more suitable when decision statistics 
are used.  
 
C. How should non-target training keypoints be chosen? 
While all existing utilization strategies train on data from 
maximum energy locations for targets, this is not the case for 
non-targets.  The methods compared in Table 1 utilize 
keypoints extracted at the top 𝐾 locations (the same 𝐾 is used 
for target data) or at 5 regularly spaced indexes.  In this section, 
we examine the choices for providing non-target training data 
to a classifier. 
We note that there are 2 main differences between the two 
proposed 𝐻0 approaches.  The first is that extracting data at 
energy locations is a physics-based criterion which may be 
superior to extracting data at regular intervals (this may include 
data at regions outside non-target signatures and thereby 
negatively biasing the classifier).  The second is that the 
approaches that extract data at regular intervals do so with more 
patches (5) than the energy based methods (the most is 4 
patches). Thus, performance improvements may be solely on 
the basis that more patches are being provided to the classifier 
when using the strategy of extracting data at regular intervals.  
For this reason, a third training condition is added where non-
target patches are taken down the depth at every fourth location 
down the A-scan (82 patches per non-target observation in 
total) which corresponds to approximately 75% overlap 
between consecutive patches.  This condition is added to test 
whether more data would improve classification performance. 
 
Figure 5: Average pAUC across the 6 conditions of features and classifiers 
of each strategy is computed in each column at an increasing maximum 
FAR value.  
 
Figure 6: Performance comparison between two different strategies for 
obtaining a final confidence: using the top 𝑳 decisions (dashed line) or 
using the 𝑳 decisions at top energy-locations (solid line).  The 2 subplots 
refer to two different non-target training strategies: (a) training on the top 
𝑲 energy locations (b) at 5 regularly extracted patches.  In both plots, each 
curve represents the average performance when varying then number of 
target patches used in training.  The error bars show the range of 
performance obtained across the different target training strategies (i.e., 
training with 1-4 patches for targets).   
  
 To present this comparison, the final confidence is computed 
on the top decision statistics, as this was shown in section V.A 
to be superior.  In Figure 7, the three methods for choosing 
training data representing non-target data are compared.  
During testing, the final confidence is obtained by summing the 
top 𝐿 decision statistics.  For all values of 𝐿, the strategy of 
providing more non-target data to the classifier improves 
performance (i.e., “Down Depth” method). 
 
D. How should target training keypoints be chosen? 
The final design question we considered regards the number 
of target patches that should be used in training.  In this section, 
we address this question in the context of the answers obtained 
in previous sections.  Therefore we train on non-target data 
extracted at small regular intervals; and during testing, we 
summed the top 𝐿 confidences.  The results suggest that the best 
performance is achieved using 𝐾 = 4 for target data. 
The results of these experiments are shown in Figure 8.  The 
results indicate that training with 4 patches, extracted at energy 
maxima locations, performs best.  As was explained in 
section III.B, MSEK chooses local maxima and in our data, the 
temporal extent of target signatures does not typically extend 
beyond having 4 local energy maxima.  This suggests that 
training on patches with some portion of the target signature is 
beneficial for the classifier.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND UTILIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this work, the question of how to choose training and 
testing data for supervised GPR BTD algorithms is addressed.  
Training and testing data consist of small patches of GPR 
imagery, which we refer to here as “keypoints”.  While most 
algorithms in the GPR literature identify keypoints in a very 
similar fashion, there is much variability in how they are 
utilized once they are identified.  In this context, utilization 
refers to several design questions: choosing, among identified 
keypoints, which keypoints should be provided to supervised 
classifiers (during training); to which keypoints the classifier 
should be applied during testing; and how a final decision 
statistic (or confidence) should be computed using the 
keypoints. A large variety of methods have been proposed in 
the literature for this purpose, and it is unclear which 
approaches are best, or whether any methods are superior to 
others.    
In order to address these questions, we compared the 
effectiveness of many existing keypoint utilization approaches 
on a large GPR dataset, and using a variety of different 
classifiers and features from the GPR literature.  We also 
proposed a new method, called PatchSelect, which was 
designed based on insights from our experiments in this work.  
Based on the results, several conclusions can be drawn: 
 
 The choice of utilization strategy has a significant 
impact on the detection performance of the resulting 
supervised algorithm.   
 There are utilization practices that generally yield 
better results.   
 We combined the best identified practices to create the 
PatchSelect strategy, which (in our experiments) is 
always superior. 
 
In addition to our large-scale comparison, we also conducted 
several smaller experiments (Section V) to elucidate which 
utilization practices yield the best results.  These experiments 
also motivated the design of PatchSelect.  In the last subsection 
here, we make a few additional recommendations and 
comments for keypoint utilization, based on the results of our 
smaller experiments Section V.  
 
A. General recommendations for keypoint utilization and 
applying PatchSelect 
The goal of this investigation was to identify best practices 
during training and testing of GPR BTD systems.  This was 
identified as an important problem because the comparison in 
section IV.A shows the possible variance of a single method 
across conditions and the change in rank ordering between 
methods across conditions.  PatchSelect represents the set of 
practices that were found to be best on a large collection under 
several conditions.  There are, however, some limitations which 
are addressed in this section. 
The first limitation is the possible computational burden from 
training with the PatchSelect training dataset.  PatchSelect 
entails training on the top 4 energy locations for targets and 
training down the depth for non-targets.  The results in 
section V.C suggest that training on non-target patches with a 
 
 
Figure 7: Non-target training strategies are compared using the 
confidences obtained using the top 𝑲 decision statistics.  The error bars 
represent the variance in training on 1-4 patches per target alarm and the 
plotted line represents the average performance. 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Performance when training on 1-4 patches per target alarm.  
This comparison is performed when training on non-target patches 
extracted at small, regular intervals and the final confidence relies on the 
top 𝑳 confidence locations. 
 bit less than 75% overlap would not degrade performance too 
much.  Similarly, the results in section V.D suggest that the 
difference between choosing 3 or 4 target patches is very slight.  
In both cases, the difference in pAUCs is < 0.007 for the 6 
features and classifier combinations tested here.  The most 
important factor seems to be to sum the top decision statistics 
during testing.  However, the results suggest that if more 
training data is needed for a particular algorithm, those 
additional patches are suitable. 
A second limitation of this work is its use of MSEK as a 
temporal localization method.  In [49], the energy related to 
target signatures was shown to be relatively localized, which 
suggests that data only around the energy maximum should be 
used in training and testing.  However, the performance of this 
approach is consistently less than summing the top 𝐿 decision 
statistics.  Experimentally, we note that summing decision 
statistics rather than the decisions at energy maxima works best 
when the data from training is representative of the data that 
observed at test time.  In this context, this means to train on data 
down the depth if testing is done down the depth.  Balancing 
the dataset in this way is an important principle in designing 
training and testing sets [59].  This result motivates an 
investigation into MSEK whose locations may be inconsistent 
between training and testing.  In this work, because the sum of 
the top decision statistics is more stable and generally performs 
best, it is recommended. 
A third limitation is the dataset which was used in this work.  
Although six different feature and classifier combinations were 
compared and their pAUC is computed at several FAR values, 
the alarms in the dataset remain the same.  While trends exist in 
the presented results, the conclusions may depend upon the 
specific choice of keypoint identification methods used in this 
work. 
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